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Abstract
The interfaces exposed by commonly used cryptographic libraries are clumsy, complicated,
and assume an understanding of cryptographic algorithms. The challenge is to design high-level
abstractions that require minimum knowledge and effort to use while also allowing maximum
control when needed.
This paper proposes such high-level abstractions consisting of simple cryptographic primi-
tives and full declarative configuration. These abstractions can be implemented on top of any
cryptographic library in any language. We have implemented these abstractions in Python, and
used them to write a wide variety of well-known security protocols, including Signal, Kerberos,
and TLS.
We show that programs using our abstractions are much smaller and easier to write than
using low-level libraries, where size of security protocols implemented is reduced by about a third
on average. We show our implementation incurs a small overhead, less than 5 microseconds for
shared key operations and less than 341 microseconds (< 1%) for public key operations. We
also show our abstractions are safe against main types of cryptographic misuse reported in the
literature.
1 Introduction
Existing cryptographic libraries are difficult to use. They require expertise that most developers
lack, and place tedious burdens on experienced developers. The danger posed by this difficulty
increases due to the proliferation of distributed computing, which requires that more developers
make more extensive use of cryptographic libraries. The difficulty of using these libraries is not new
[And93, Pri92], but the extent of the problem grows as computers become more deeply embedded
in our everyday lives. Mobile computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) especially encourage
the storage and transmission of sensitive data. Consumers will expect such data to be properly
secured, requiring that developers make greater use of cryptographic libraries.
A symptom that reveals the underlying problem with existing cryptographic libraries is the
issue of cryptographic misuse—improper use of cryptographic APIs leading to violations of secu-
rity requirements [EBFK13, pp. 73]. A string of papers, beginning in 2012, have documented
widespread cryptographic misuse in mobile applications [FHM+12, EBFK13, BML+14, LZLG14,
LCWZ14, SGT+14, CNKX16, MLLD16]. These works define specific types of cryptographic misuse
and build tools to detect them.
For example, Egele et al. [EBFK13] found that 88% of the 11,748 Android apps analyzed by
their tool, CryptoLint, contained at least one cryptographic misuse. A similar study by Ma et
al. [MLLD16] found that 99% of the 8,640 Android apps they analyzed contained at least one
cryptographic misuse. However, detecting misuse is not sufficient to prevent all misuse.
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At the same time, higher-level cryptographic libraries have been developed, as discussed in
Section 7, but they limit the choices that experts can make in using and experimenting with
different cryptographic algorithms. What are the right high-level abstractions that avoid different
pitfalls?
This paper proposes SecAlgo, high-level abstractions for cryptographic operations that aim
to minimize the difficulty of using cryptographic libraries in writing secure programs, for both
non-experts and experts. SecAlgo provides simplest cryptographic primitives plus full declarative
configurations. It can be implemented on top of any cryptographic library in any language. We have
implemented SecAlgo in Python, and used it to write a variety of well-known security protocols,
including Signal [Ope16], Kerberos [NYHR05], and TLS [DR08].
We show that SecAlgo reduces programmer effort and increases clarity of programs; implemen-
tation of the abstractions incurs minimum overhead; and the abstractions prevent significant types
of cryptographic misuse.
We first describe the need for better cryptographic abstractions in Section 2. We define SecAlgo
abstractions in Section 3, and describe their implementation in Section 4. Section 5 shows applica-
tion in implementing security protocols. Section 6 presents experimental results. Section 7 discusses
related work and concludes. Appendix A presents studies of types of cryptographic misuse pre-
vented.
2 What are the right cryptographic abstractions?
There are two reasons that better abstractions for cryptographic operations are needed: (1) APIs
for existing low-level cryptographic libraries make it too difficult to properly use cryptographic
primitives and (2) existing high-level libraries with simplified interfaces place too many restrictions
on what experts can choose, because of the limited expressive power of the abstractions used.
Difficult-to-use low-level cryptographic libraries.
The low-level APIs provided by cryptographic libraries require many decisions, including ones that
must be coordinated, sometimes repeatedly, in order to correctly use cryptographic primitives.
Making these decisions demands significant expertise and tedious manual effort. Even experienced
programmers are likely to make mistakes. Such mistakes will compromise the security objective the
programmer tries to achieve by using the cryptographic primitives, as studied in the cryptographic
misuse literature, e.g., [EBFK13, SGT+14, CNKX16, MLLD16].
Proper use of low-level cryptographic APIs requires considerable security expertise. So one
might think that we can address the difficulty of using these APIs by providing clear, thorough
documentation and high-quality examples of proper use. However, it will not suffice as a solution,
because the real issue is the sheer number of low-level decisions that must be made when using
low-level APIs.
A right solution must directly address this complexity by protecting both non-experts and
experts from mistakes caused by carelessness, neglect, limited time and attention, exhaustion, and
other conditions that afflict humans confronted with unnecessary complexity.
Unduly restrictive high-level cryptographic libraries.
There are now a number of higher-level cryptographic libraries, Tink [ABD+18], Libsodium [Fra17],
Keyczar [Tea16], and pyca/cryptography’s Fernet API [Pyt18a], that provide simplified interfaces
to reduce the tedious difficulty of using cryptographic functionality and assist non-expert users to
avoid mistakes. This is accomplished by offering a limited set of abstractions for common operations
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and a restriction on the choice of algorithms, key sizes, and other configuration options.
However, expert users can find the limitations imposed by these high-level libraries restrictive
and confining. Experts may want to use or test particular combinations of algorithms in security
protocols and secure applications. They may find it difficult or impossible to do this when using
existing high-level cryptographic libraries.
This issue may force expert users to return to low-level cryptographic libraries, because the
large number of arguments, options, and configurations made available by low-level cryptographic
libraries affords expert users their desired flexibility and expressive power.
SecAlgo: High-level abstractions with full range of control.
What’s needed is a way to abstract over cryptographic functionalities that combines the desirable
features of both low-level and high-level cryptographic libraries while avoiding their drawbacks.
We want to provide a simple, safe interface for all users to easily use the cryptographic function-
alities they need, while giving expert users the expressive power to configure the cryptographic
functionalities they want.
SecAlgo provides such high-level abstractions, requiring minimum, or zero, control by non-
expert users, and allowing maximum, or full, control by expert users. In SecAlgo, the abstractions
for determining what cryptographic operation to perform are pulled apart from the abstractions
used to determine how that operation is performed.
• SecAlgo includes five primitive functions: keygen for key generation, encrypt and decrypt for
public key and shared key encryption, and sign and verify for public key signing and MAC
creation. MAC is treated as a kind of signing, just as in Bellare et al. [BGR95]. Cryptographic
hash functions are also included as a degenerate form of signing (if no key is supplied, sign
returns a hash). These are all the basic cryptographic operations that any application might
require. Every function except for keygen takes only the data and key as arguments.
The user can optionally specify the encryption or signing algorithm to use when generating the
key, otherwise a safe default algorithm is used. Non-expert users can use all the functionalities
they need in a safe and simple way.
• SecAlgo also provides a rich and expressive abstraction for declarative configuration. Expert
users can declaratively configure all attributes used by all cryptographic algorithms to exert
fine-grained control over the behavior of SecAlgo’s primitive functions. In this way, Sec-
Algo provides the flexibility that expert users desire without reintroducing the complexity of
low-level cryptography libraries.
Other important cryptographic functionalities, such as key management functions, can be added
to SecAlgo by building them on top of the five primitive functions or by wrapping existing imple-
mentations of the functionalities in cryptographic libraries.
3 High-level cryptographic abstractions
The abstractions in SecAlgo are of two kinds: (1) high-level cryptographic operations to provide
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity, and (2) declarative configuration for all feasible combi-
nations of options. We describe language constructs for the first kind along with their essential
arguments; additional arguments can be specified either as optional arguments or using config-
uration. Properly chosen configuration values—as determined by the current best practices in
security—are used as default.
3
SecAlgo abstractions aim to serve both experts and non-experts. Experts can use optional
arguments and configuration to call and compose a wide range of cryptographic operations. Non-
experts can rely on the default arguments and configurations to use safe cryptographic operations.
Abstractions for cryptographic operations.
SecAlgo has five basic cryptographic operations for writing security protocols and secure ap-
plications: key generation, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification. SecAlgo provides
an abstraction for each basic operation. The abstractions allow simplest use of cryptographic
algorithms—only the choice of shared vs. public key algorithms needs to be made for key genera-
tion, and only the data and key are needed for the other four operations.
All other choices are provided through declarative configurations. Users can configure multiple
interrelated arguments among a set of choices for each argument, and the state configured at key
generation is maintained through subsequent, continued uses of the other four operations. This
contrasts with operations, such as generating a random value, that return only a simple value to
be used subsequently.
We use a generic syntax in this section; each of the five operations can be implemented in any
programming language as a single API function.
Key generation is of the following form, where type t is the name of a particular cryptographic
algorithm, such as AES or RSA, or a generic shared or public.
keygen type t
It generates and returns a key or pair of keys suitable for the cryptographic algorithm corresponding
to type t.
• If t is the name of a specific shared-key (also called symmetric-key) algorithm, such as AES,
or is the generic shared, then keygen returns a single value, a shared key. This key will be
labeled with the name of the algorithm, t. If the generic shared type is used, then the key is
labeled with the name of the configured shared-key algorithm.
• If t is the name of a specific public-key (also called asymmetric-key) algorithm, such as RSA,
or is the generic public, then keygen returns a pair of values, a private key and a public key.
Each key is labeled with the name of the algorithm, t. The two components of the pair can be
retrieved by using a simultaneous assignment (in languages that support such assignments,
such as Python) or by using two retrieval operations.
The size of the key can be specified as an optional argument to keygen, in an additional clause
size s or otherwise declared as part of the configuration; if the size is left unspecified the default
is used.
If t names a block cipher, such as AES, then a mode of operation [Dwo01]—an algorithm for
repeatedly applying the block cipher to encrypt an arbitrary size plaintext, such as Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC)—must also be specified. Like key size, the mode of operation can be specified as
an optional argument in an additional clause mode m or declared as a part of the configuration. If
left unspecified, the default mode of operation is used.
Encryption and decryption provide confidentiality, also known as secrecy, and are of the
forms below.
encrypt text txt key k
decrypt text txt key k
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Function encrypt encrypts text txt using key k and returns the resulting encrypted text. Function
decrypt decrypts text txt using key k and returns the resulting decrypted text. They call the
appropriate low-level library functions as determined by the key type, size, and mode.
Signing and verification provide authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, and are of
the forms below.
sign text txt key k
verify text txt sig s key k
verify text txt key k
Function sign signs txt using key k. Signing has two modes: When the mode is detached, sign
returns just the signature; when the mode is combined, sign returns the signed text. The mode
of signing is determined by configuration, described below. The first form of function verify,
for sign used in detached mode, verifies signature s against txt using key k, and returns true if
verification succeeds and false otherwise. The second form of function verify, for sign used in
combined mode, verifies signed txt using key k and returns the original text if verification succeeds
and false otherwise.
Declarative configuration.
Configuration declaratively specifies values of parameters for cryptographic operations, and is of
the form below, where configuration item item is assigned the value value.
configure item = value
Table 1 lists supported configuration items, their allowed values, and default values.
Item Allowed values Default value References
key type shared, public shared
key type shared AES, Blowfish, 3DES,
Salsa20, ChaCha20
AES AES [NIS01], Blowfish [Sch94],
3DES [NIS17], Salsa20 [Ber08b],
ChaCha20 [Ber08a]
key type public RSA, DSA, ECDSA RSA RSA [MKJR16], DSA, ECDSA [NIS13]
key size shared positive integer* 256**
key size public positive integer* 2048**
block cipher mode CBC, CTR, CFB, EAX,
GCM, CCM, SIV, OCB
GCM CBC, CTR, CFB [Dwo01],
EAX [BRW03], GCM [Dwo07],
CCM [Dwo04], SIV [Har08],
OCB [KR14]
sign hash SHA224, SHA256,
SHA384, SHA512
SHA256 [NIS15]
sign mode detached, combined detached
backend library PyCrypto, PyNaCl,
PyCryptodome,
pyca/cryptography
PyCrypto PyCrypto [Lit13], PyNaCl [Pyt18b],
PyCryptodome [Eij18], pyca/cryptog-
raphy [Pyt18a]
Table 1: Configuration items, allowed values, and the default value. * for key size indicates that
allowed values depend on the algorithm and backend library selected. ** for key size indicates the
default value that follows the NIST advice [NIS16].
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Declarative configuration allows security experts to exert control over the operation of high-
level cryptographic abstractions in a clear and simple way. Proper default configuration values—
ones that capture the best practices as determined by security experts—are defined. This relieves
developers of the burden of making choices about security algorithms, key sizes, modes, etc. for
which they lack the relevant expertise or which are unnecessarily tedious to decide and code at a
low level.
Configurations can be declared to apply globally, for particular sets of processes or communi-
cation channels, for particular scopes such as a method scope, or specified as optional arguments
to individual operations. Configurations declared for an enclosed scope override those declared for
an enclosing scope.
4 Implementation
We have developed a prototype implementation of SecAlgo as a Python module—a library of
Python functions, one for each of the five basic operations described in the previous section.
SecAlgo is implemented on top of PyCrypto [Lit13] for shared-key encryption using block ci-
phers (AES and Triple DES) in classical modes (CBC, CTR, CFB, OFB), message authentication
code creation (HMAC), public key encryption (RSA), and public key digital signing (RSA, DSA).
SecAlgo also provides support for Diffie-Hellman key pair generation using pre-established Diffie-
Hellman parameters defined in [KK03, LK08], but not yet abstraction for shared secret computa-
tion.
In addition, SecAlgo utilizes PyNaCl [Pyt18b], PyCryptodome [Eij18], and pyca/cryptogra-
phy [Pyt18a] (sometimes called cryptography.io [ABF+17]) for authenticated encryption modes for
block ciphers (CCM [Dwo04], EAX [BRW03], GCM [Dwo07], SIV [Har08], OCB [KR14]), safe
stream ciphers (Salsa20 [Ber08b], ChaCha20 [Ber08a]), key derivation functions (HKDF [KE10]),
elliptic curve digital signing [BDL+12], and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman shared secret computa-
tion [Ber06].
Some of these features (authenticated encryption modes, stream ciphers, elliptic curve digital
signing) fall under our five abstractions. For the other operations, SecAlgo provides a high-level
wrapper API around a fixed library implementation with a fixed set of parameters—choice of library
implementation or configuration is currently not provided for these operations. Choice of RSA as
the default for public key encryption and signing is due to current incomplete support of elliptic
curve cryptography. This will be updated in future work.
Key generation.
Implementation of keygen uses functions in the low-level cryptographic libraries based on the type,
size, and mode of operation specified.
To use only safe algorithms and implementations, SecAlgo checks all arguments of keygen against
whitelists for approved combinations of algorithm types, key sizes, modes of operation, and hash
functions. If the check fails, then keygen terminates and reports an error.
SecAlgo also makes sure that all key material—the bytes that form the shared secret for shared
keys, or the modulus and exponents that form the public and private parts of the key pairs for
RSA—is generated through calls to cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generators,
which are usually provided by low-level cryptographic libraries and operating systems.
SecAlgo stores key material in a structure that also contains labels for algorithm type (value of
key type), key size (value of key size shared or key size public), block cipher mode of operation
(value of block cipher mode), public vs. private part of the key pair if key type is public, mode
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of signing (value of sign mode), and the name of the hash function used by MAC and signing
algorithms (value of sign hash). The implementation uses Python’s dict to hold the key material
and labels.
Encrypt, decrypt, sign, and verify.
For encryption, decryption, signing, and verification, SecAlgo manages tedious low-level details so
that they remain hidden.
First, SecAlgo verifies that the input data is in a proper representation for submission to the
cryptographic functions of the low-level cryptographic library. This includes making sure the input
data is of the correct type and, if required by the encryption algorithm and mode of operation, of
the proper size.
For example, PyCrypto requires that plaintexts are bytes-like objects [Lit13] (a bytes-like object
is one that supports the Buffer Protocol, such as bytes, bytearray, or memoryview). If the input
data is not of a compatible type and can not be safely converted to the required type, then an error
is signaled to the user.
Additionally, shared-key block algorithms have a block size–a fixed number of bytes to which
the algorithm can be applied. Some modes of operation (such as CBC) require that every block of
plaintext input must be of the block size. When using these modes for messages whose length is
not divisible by the block size, SecAlgo automatically pads the data using a method that is safe for
the encryption algorithm. For example, when using a block cipher in CBC mode, SecAlgo applies
the PKCS7 [Hou09] padding algorithm, which appends N bytes of value N to pad the plaintext to
a multiple of the block size, where:
N = block size− (plaintext length % block size)
Any padding is stripped from the decrypted data before it is returned. To avoid leaking information
used by padding oracle attacks, SecAlgo does not report when padding errors cause decryption
failure.
Also, SecAlgo generates and handles any auxiliary values used by the selected algorithm or
mode of operation: initialization vectors, counters, and nonces. For example, Counter (CTR)
mode encryption uses a counter, which can be any function that produces a sequence of block-size
bytes values guaranteed not to repeat for a large number of iterations. SecAlgo follows a standard
method [Dwo01] to generate the initial counter value by using a random value for the top-half of the
counter and setting the bottom-half to 0. The random top-half value of the counter is prepended
to the ciphertext.
For public key encryption, SecAlgo uses a straightforward hybrid encryption [CS01] scheme to
encrypt arbitrary amounts of plaintext data. A single call to a public key encryption method can
only encrypt a number of bytes that is less than the public key size. SecAlgo first checks the size
of the plaintext to determine whether it can be encrypted directly using the public key algorithm,
given the key size. If not, SecAlgo generates a 256-bit shared key and encrypts the data using
AES in GCM mode. The new shared key is then encrypted with the public key algorithm. The
public–key–encrypted AES key is prepended to the AES–in–GCM–mode–encrypted data, and this
concatenation is returned.
The sign and verify functions are straightforward implementations of the behavior described in
Section 3 using cryptographic functions specified by the configuration.
SecAlgo relies on the implementations in backend libraries to provide protection against side-
channel attacks, such as timing channel mitigations built into some cryptographic libraries. Pro-
viding additional rigorous protection is future work.
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5 Application: Implementing security protocols
To demonstrate the effectiveness of SecAlgo, we implemented a collection of well-known security
protocols, such as Needham-Schroeder and others in the SPORE repository [SPO03], as well as sig-
nificant parts of more substantial protocols: TLS version 1.2 [DR08], Kerberos version 5 [NYHR05],
and the Signal protocol [Ope16, Mox13] (including its components the Double Ratchet proto-
col [Tre16] and the Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH) protocol [Mox16]). Table 2 lists 10 of
the protocols we implemented.
We implemented these protocols using SecAlgo plus the DistAlgo language [LSLG12, LSL17,
LL18], an extension of Python that provides high-level primitives for creating distributed processes,
passing messages, and synchronization. The combination of SecAlgo with DistAlgo enables us to
write clear, high-level implementations of security protocols.
The top part of Figure 1 shows the Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol [DS81] (a variation
on the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol [NS78]). There are three parties, an
initiator (A), a responder (B), and a trusted authentication server (AS). The goal is to securely
establish a new shared key (CK) known only to A and B. A acquires certificates containing its own
public key (CA) and B’s public key (CB). These certificates are passed by A to B in message 3.
With the keys contained in these certificates, A and B use public key cryptography to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the new shared key, and to authenticate each other.
1. A→ AS : A,B
2. AS → A : CA,CB
3. A→ B : CA,CB, {{CK,T}SA}PB
Where:
• A and B are users, and AS is a centralized key distribution facility called an Au-
thentication Server.
• T is a timestamp
• PX and SX denote user X’s public key and secret (signature) key respectively
• CA = {A,PA, T}SAS and CB = {B,PB , T}SAS
• The key CK is then used for encrypting messages transmitted between A and B.
1. A→ B : {{CK}SA}PB
2. B → A : {msg}CK
Figure 1: Top: Denning-Sacco public key distribution protocol [DS81, p. 535]. Bottom: Simplified
Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol [Bla11].
A simplified version of the Denning-Sacco protocol [Bla11] is shown in the bottom part of
Figure 1. It assumes that A and B both already possess the other’s public key. As a result, A
does not need to get certificates containing those public keys from AS, which eliminates AS and
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the first two messages. The simplified protocol also does away with the timestamp (T) associated
with the new shared key. The simplified protocol extends the original protocol to include sending
an encrypted application message.
Figure 2 shows the simplified Denning-Sacco protocol in SecAlgo plus DistAlgo. On line 10, mes-
sage 1 of the simplified protocol is sent, and on lines 23-24 that message is received, the encrypted
shared key and signature are decrypted, and then the signature on the shared key is verified. Lines
11-12 and 25 illustrate the use of the new shared key to transmit encrypted messages readable only
by A and B. A message (m) is encrypted and sent on line 25, received on line 11, and decrypted
on line 12.
1 from secalgo import *
2 configure (sign_mode = ’combined ’)
3
4 class RoleA (process ): # type A process
5 def setup(skA , B, pkB ): # take in params
6 pass
7
8 def run ():
9 k = keygen(’shared ’) # new shared key
10 send ((1, encrypt(sign (k, skA), pkB)), to=B)
11 await(some (received ((2, enc_m), from_=_B )))
12 m = decrypt (enc_m , k)
13 output(’Decrypted secret:’, m)
14
15 class RoleB (process ): # type B process
16 def setup(skB , pkA ): # take in params
17 self .m = ’secret ’ # set secret msg
18
19 def run ():
20 await(False)
21
22 def receive (msg=(1, enc_k), from_=A):
23 k = verify(decrypt (enc_k , skB), pkA)
24 if k: # k is not false
25 send ((2, encrypt (m, k)), to=A)
26
27 def main ():
28 skA ,pkA = keygen(’public ’) # prv ,pub key of A
29 skB ,pkB = keygen(’public ’) # prv ,pub key of B
30 B = new(RoleB , (skB , pkA)) # create B
31 A = new(RoleA , (skA ,B,pkB))# create A
32 start(B)
33 start(A)
Figure 2: Simplified Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol.
Each role in a protocol can be defined as a distinct process class. By extending process, a
process in DistAlgo can send messages (lines 10 and 25), handle received messages (line 22), and
await for synchronization conditions to become true (line 11).
This example illustrates several important features of SecAlgo:
1. Functions encrypt and decrypt can transparently provide both shared-key and public-key
cryptographic operations as determined by the key type (shared-key on lines 12 and 25;
public-key on lines 10 and 23).
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2. Functions encrypt, decrypt, sign, and verify compose smoothly at a high level needing no
extra effort (lines 10 and 23).
3. The return behavior of sign is controlled by the configuration statement on line 2, where
sign mode is set to combined. As a result, on line 10, sign returns a pair of k and the
signature over k. On line 23, verify takes that pair as first argument, and so returns k itself,
if verification succeeds (and False otherwise). On Line 24, we test the return from verify to
ensure that the verification succeeded before using the key k to encrypt the secret in message
2.
If sign mode had been set to detached on Line 2, the following changes to the program are
required:
Line 10 is replaced with:
send((1, encrypt((k, sign(k, skA)), pkB)), to=B)
where the key k is included separately in the body of message 1 because sign will return
only the signature.
Lines 23-24 are replaced with:
k, sig = decrypt(enc k, skB)
if verify(k, sig, pkA):
where the key k and the signature sig must first be retrieved from the encrypted text
before they can be passed to verify.
4. The developer is relieved of any extra tasks associated with using cryptographic operations.
There is no need to generate an IV or a counter, or to pad plaintexts, for those algorithms
that require it. All those tasks are managed in the background.
This last point demonstrates how SecAlgo simplifies decision-making about cryptographic opera-
tions. Even for the simplified Denning-Sacco protocol:
• The protocol contains three calls to keygen, two calls each to encrypt and decrypt, and one
call each to sign and verify.
• Those three calls to keygen contain between 9 and 18 decisions regarding operation, algorithm,
key size, mode of operation, padding, decisions with 66 possible outcomes.
These decision points are all occasions for a programmer, even an experienced one, to make mistakes.
SecAlgo defaults ensure that all those decisions are made safely.
6 Experimental evaluation
We show that SecAlgo allows secure programs to be written much more easily than using lower-
level libraries and incurs a minimum overhead. We also show in Appendix A that SecAlgo prevents
seven main types of cryptographic misuse that are prevalent in mobile applications.
We compare measurements of programs that directly use SecAlgo with those that use the
following lower-level libraries upon which SecAlgo is built:
• PyCrypto: The most widely-used general-purpose cryptography library for Python [ABF+17,
Table 1].
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• pyca/cryptography: The second-most widely-used general purpose cryptography library for
Python [ABF+17, Table 1].
• PyCryptodome: A fork of PyCrypto extended to include newer cryptographic operations;
still not in wide use [ABF+17, Table 1].
• PyNaCl: The best available Python interface for Curve 25519 elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy [ABF+17].
The last three libraries provide additional operations not available in PyCrypto.
6.1 Code size and programming effort
SecAlgo has been used to implement over 20 security protocols, including those listed in Table 2.
We compare implementations in SecAlgo with alternative implementations that use the lower-
level cryptographic libraries PyCrypto, pyca/cryptography, PyCryptodome, and PyNaCl directly,
and with abstract specifications written for protocol verification tools. We also compare with
implementations in Java, C#, and Python for NS-SK, the corrected Needham–Schroeder shared
key protocol.
Protocol Description
NS-SK Corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol for key distribution by key server via
shared key encryption [NS78]
NS-PK Corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol for mutual authentication via public key
encryption [NS78, NS87]
DS Denning-Sacco protocol for key distribution by key server and mutual authenti-
cation via public key encryption [DS81]
DS Simp Simplified Denning-Sacco protocol for key distribution and mutual authentication
via public key encryption [Bla11]
DHKE-1 Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with mutual authentication via public key
signatures [Sho99]
SDH Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [CK01]
X3DH Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange with mutual authentication via el-
liptic curve public key signatures [Mox16]
DR Double Ratchet (aka Axolotl) encrypted message exchange protocol via shared
key authenticated encryption [Tre16]
Signal Signal: A ratcheting forward secrecy protocol for synchronous and asynchronous
messaging environments [Ope16, Mox13]
KRB-5 Kerberos, version 5, protocol for key distribution by key server and mutual au-
thentication via shared key encryption [NYHR05]
TLS-1.2 Transport Layer Security (Handshake), version 1.2, for key exchange and mutual
authentication via public key encryption [DR08]
Table 2: Well-known security protocols.
Table 3 gives the LOC (number of lines of code without comments) for the protocols listed in
Table 2. We use LOC as an indirect measure of programming effort and program clarity. This is
common practice in programming language literature.
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Protocols SecAlgo+DistAlgo PyCrypto+DistAlgo Scyther AVISPA ProVerif Tamarin CryptoVerif
NS-PK 47 96 36 55 107 109 116
NS-SK 46 68 41 82 94
DS 50 102 96 120
DS Simp 26 69
DHKE-1 63 113 41
SDH 39 73 35 41 48 89
X3DH 140 151
DR 182 199
Signal 321 349
KRB-5 171 213 94 137 186
TLS (v. 1.2) 430 (v. 1.2) 478 (v. 1.0) 53 (v. 1.0) 107 (v. 1.3) 397 (v. 1.0) 128
Table 3: LOC of protocol implementations (executable on distributed machines) in Sec-
Algo+Distalgo and PyCrypto+DistAlgo, and of abstract specifications in the languages and tools:
Scyther [Cre14], AVISPA [ARBO06b], ProVerif [Bla18], Tamarin [MSC+18], and CryptoVerif Cryp-
toVerifSource. Our implementations of X3DH, DR, and Signal include 58 lines of Python code
taken directly from the specification [Tre16]. Empty entry means we did not find a corresponding
specification.
Ease of programming using SecAlgo.
The simplified function calls, automated generation of auxiliary values, declarative configuration,
and carefully selected default options in the implementation of SecAlgo result in a reduction of the
number of lines required to invoke cryptographic operations, and a simplification of those lines,
when compared to other libraries.
For example, to encrypt a string pt using AES in CBC mode with a 32-byte key using PyCrypto,
one must do the following:
k = Random.new().read(32)
iv = Random.new().read(AES.blocksize)
cipher = AES.new(k, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
ct = iv + cipher.encrypt(pad(pickle.dumps(pt)))
We can perform the same operation in SecAlgo as follows, where key = is optional as in Python:
k = keygen(’shared’)
ct = encrypt(pt, key = k)
We see a similar reduction in the number and complexity of lines of code for the other cryptographic
operations supported by SecAlgo. In addition, we can alter the algorithm, keysize, and mode by
declaring a new configuration, without having to alter either the call to keygen or the call to encrypt.
Our experience is that writing protocols using SecAlgo plus DistAlgo is much easier than using
other languages and libraries. For simpler protocols like the first 6 in Table 2, we were able to
implement them in SecAlgo plus DistAlgo, with LOC shown in column 2 of Table 3, by simply
following their protocol narrations.
Seven relatively simple protocols, not listed in Table 2, were written by undergraduates and
high-school students who, despite having had no or little familiarity with Python and being entirely
new to SecAlgo and cryptography (as well as to DistAlgo and distributed programming), were able
to complete the implementation in a couple of weeks with minimal assistance.
For X3DH, DR, and Signal protocols, we were able to easily use the core protocol specification
from [Tre16], which uses pseudocode that is simply Python code. We then added implementations
of the lower-level cryptographic functions, which they call “external functions”, using other libraries
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for elliptic curve cryptography (Curve 25519 for both signing and Diffie-Hellman) and key derivation
(HKDF).
Comparison with using PyCrypto.
We also implemented the protocols in Table 2 using PyCrypto (and PyNaCl for X3DH, DR, and
Signal) plus DistAlgo. Column 3 of Table 3 shows the LOC of these implementations. Executing
these programs produces the same calls to the underlying cryptography libraries as those in column
2.
Table 4 lists the number of calls to SecAlgo functions that appear in each protocol implementa-
tion. Each SecAlgo function call uses 1 or more fewer lines of code compared with using PyCrypto
and other lower-level libraries. As a result, protocol implementations written using SecAlgo are
shorter and simpler than those written using PyCrypto and other lower-level libraries.
Protocol keygen encrypt decrypt sign verify Total
NS-SK 3 5 5 0 0 13
NS-PK 3 3 3 2 2 13
DS 4 1 1 3 5 14
DS Simp 3 2 2 1 1 9
DHKE-1 7 0 0 4 4 15
SDH 5 0 0 2 2 9
X3DH 18 1 1 2 2 24
DR 11 1 1 3 1 17
Signal 29 2 2 5 3 41
KRB-5 6 6 6 6 6 30
TLS-1.2 14 3 3 4 3 27
Table 4: Number of calls to SecAlgo functions in each protocol implementation.
The average percentage difference in LOC across all implementations written using SecAlgo
(shown in column 2 of Table 3) compared to those written using low-level libraries (shown in
column 3 of Table 3) is 31%, that is, using SecAlgo reduces LOC of protocol implementations by
almost a third on average.
Comparison with abstract protocol specifications.
Columns 4 to 8 of Table 3 show LOC of abstract specifications for the protocols in Table 2 in
the best security protocol specification languages (for all we could find), as written by experts
in these languages. These specifications are not executable, and are used as input to specialized
verifiers of the respective languages. Our executable SecAlgo programs are actually similar in size
to the most abstract of these specifications, as evidenced by the similar LOC. The SecAlgo plus
DistAlgo implementations of all but the last 2 protocols have smaller LOC than all of the abstract
specifications except for those in Scyther (SPDL [CM12]).
For the last 2 protocols, TLS and Kerberos, the most significant cause of the larger LOC of the
SecAlgo plus DistAlgo implementation is functionalities omitted from the abstract specifications.
For example, the abstract specifications of TLS include only the TLS Handshake protocol, whereas
the SecAlgo plus DistAlgo implementation also includes the TLS Record protocol and the TLS
ChangeCipherSpec protocol. For Kerberos, none of the abstract specifications construct tickets
with actual timestamps, or use those timestamps to validate tickets, whereas the SecAlgo plus
DistAlgo implementation does both.
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Comparison with using other programming languages for NS-SK.
Table 5 compares implementations of NS-SK in C#, Java, PyCrypto plus Python, SecAlgo plus
Python, PyCrypto plus DistAlgo and SecAlgo plus DistAlgo. The implementations use different
libraries for distributed programming and cryptographic operations. These implementations were
developed by ourselves or with our supervision, and they represent our best effort, so far, to use
each language in the best way. For LOC comparison, we formatted the programs according to the
suggested style of each language.
Language Crypto library NS-SK
C# .NET Cryptography [Mic18] 364
Java JCA [Ora18] 351
Python PyCrypto [Lit13] 217
Python SecAlgo 170
DistAlgo PyCrypto [Lit13] 68
DistAlgo SecAlgo 46
Table 5: LOC of NS-SK implementations using different languages and libraries.
The C# and Java programs required much more effort than the Python programs, which re-
quired much more effort than the DistAlgo programs. This is also evident in the LOC comparison.
Our experience writing these implementations confirmed that using high-level cryptographic and
communication abstractions significantly help reduce program size and programming effort and
increase program clarity.
6.2 Running times and overhead
We discuss three running time experiments measuring (1) the time taken by SecAlgo functions
compared with using the underlying lower-level cryptographic library directly, (2) the time of cryp-
tographic operations vs. message passing in protocols, and (3) the time of NS-SK implementations
using SecAlgo vs. using PyCrypto on top of DistAlgo and Python, vs. implementations in Java
and C#.
All reported running times are CPU times measured on an Intel Core i5-5250U processor of
2.70GHZ with 16GB of DDR3L memory, running Ubuntu 17.10, DistAlgo 1.0.12, and Python
3.6.3. PyCrypto 2.6, PyCryptdome 3.5.1, pyca/cryptography 2.2.2, and PyNaCl 1.2.1 are used for
cryptographic operations. For all experiments the Python garbage collector was disabled. For each
measurement, protocols and cryptographic operations are run in a loop for at least one second and
the CPU time is averaged over the number of iterations in order to get an accurate estimate of
the CPU time for a single execution of that protocol or operation. Each of those measurements is
repeated at least 50 times, and the average is taken.
Overhead of SecAlgo abstractions.
We fix a configuration—an algorithm, a key size, a mode of operation, and a padding—and measure
the running time of each SecAlgo primitive. We measure the same operation written using PyCrypto
directly. The measurement for using PyCrypto directly also includes the time needed to encode
input to cryptographic functions as byte strings and the reverse for output from the cryptographic
functions. This is done because it is required by the low-level libraries. We use the pickle library
for Python for encoding and decoding.
Table 6 shows that SecAlgo primitives impose small overhead for all cryptographic primitives
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compared with using PyCrypto. The overhead is ≤ 4.5 microseconds for all shared key primitives,
The overhead is ≤ 13.02 microseconds for all public key primitives except for 340.54 microseconds
for keygen, but all are < 1%.
Operation Configuration PyCrypto SecAlgo Increase % Increase
Shared
key
keygen AES, 256, CBC, PKCS7 47.36 49.55 2.19 4.62
encrypt AES, 256, CBC, PKCS7 65.93 70.43 4.50 6.83
decrypt AES, 256, CBC, PKCS7 14.46 16.71 2.25 15.56
sign HMAC, 256, SHA512 16.9 18.65 1.75 10.36
verify HMAC, 256, SHA512 17.26 18.84 1.58 9.15
Public
key
keygen RSA, 2048 124,526.75 124.867.29 340.54 0.27
encrypt RSA, 2048, OAEP 1,322.00 1,322.42 0.42 0.03
decrypt RSA, 2048, OAEP 3100.17 3106.41 6.24 0.20
sign RSA, 2048, PKCS1 2995.29 3008.31 13.02 0.43
verify RSA, 2048, PKCS1 698.92 705.21 6.29 0.90
Table 6: Cryptographic operations and configurations used, CPU times (in microseconds) when
using PyCrypto and using SecAlgo, and time increase (in microseconds) and percentage increase
from PyCrypto time to SecAlgo time.
Public keys used by SecAlgo are 8 times as large as those used for shared key cryptography
(2048-bit vs. 256-bit). This means that public key primitives may have more varied increases in
running times due to memory effect, as observed. At the same time, because public key primitives
are much more expensive, the percentage increases may be much smaller, again as observed.
Running time of cryptographic operations in total protocol time.
To understand the running times of cryptographic operations among total protocol time, we measure
these times for each protocol in Table 2, and we show the contributing factors by counting the
number of calls to different cryptographic functions and the number of messages passed.
For protocol time, we measure the time used by each role excluding process setup time, and
sum over all roles. For the time of all cryptographic operations, which we call library time, we
measure the time of each SecAlgo function call and sum over all calls. We collect the counts of
calls and messages for the measured execution of each protocol.
Table 7 shows the results, grouped by the kinds of cryptographics functions called and sorted by
decreasing library time in each group. Cryptogrpahic functions are listed in the order of expensive
ones first: modular exponentiation (pow) for Diffie-Hellman, RSA functions, elliptic curve (EC)
functions, and shared key functions (SK); among RSA functions, keygen, decrypt and sign that
use private keys, and encrypt and verify that use public keys; among EC functions, keygen and
the rest.
For library time, we see that it is almost fully determined by the counts of calls to more expensive
functions, with two exceptions: (1) SDH and DHKE-1 both have the same numbers of expensive
calls, especially power function pow to compute Diffie-Hellman shared secrets, but the larger time
for SDH is because it uses values that are 3 times as large; (2) Signal uses EC, but it has many
more calls to EC keygen and thus a slightly larger library time than DS Simp and TLS 1.2 that use
RSA but have few calls of non-keygen functions. In fact, with the exception of Signal, the library
time is sorted completely in decreasing order.
Protocol time is also mostly in decreasing order, but with three exceptions: TLS 1.2, Signal,
and NS-SK. This is because protocol time is also affected by the number of messages passed during
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Protocol pow
RSA EC
SK
Library
time
Protocol
time
Time
diff.
Messageskey-
gen
dec.
sign
enc.
veri.
key-
gen
rest
SDH 2 2 2 2 160.08 161.71 1.63 3
DHKE-1 2 2 2 4 42.60 45.89 3.29 3
NS-PK 5 5 19.87 27.87 7.99 7
DS 4 6 1 17.59 22.76 5.17 3
DS Simp 2 2 3 8.34 10.40 2.06 2
TLS 1.2 1 3 33 6.90 20.33 13.43 9-13*
Signal 11 19 29 8.40 19.05 10.65 8
DR 6 9 25 4.93 9.70 4.77 6
X3DH 5 10 4 3.72 8.42 4.70 4
KRBv5 26 0.75 8.45 7.70 6
NS-SK 11 0.61 11.61 10.99 7
Table 7: Number of calls to diferent cryptographic functions (with expensive ones first), CPU times
(in milliseconds) of protocol run and library calls, difference between the two times, and number of
messages passed. An empty entry denotes 0. ∗ for TLS1.2 indicates that the number of messages
can differ when different branching conditions hold; our experiments used the condition for which
9 messages are passed.
the protocol run. In fact, the three exceptions are from protocols that have the most messages.
We consider the difference between protocol and library times. We see that for each group, a
larger time difference corresponds to a larger number of messages, with one exception: SDH and
DHKE-1 both have 3 messages, but the larger difference for DHKE-1 is due to additional local,
non-cryptographic computations in DHKE-1 but not in SDH.
Comparison with using Python and PyCrypto on NK-SK.
Figure 3 shows the running times of NS-SK written using SecAlgo and PyCrypto on top of DistAlgo
and Python, for all 4 combinations, measured by repeating NS-SK on increasing numbers of runs.
All 4 implementations show a linear increase in running time as the number of runs increases.
The difference between using SecAlgo and using PyCrypto, on top of DistAlgo or on top of Python,
is small: at most 2.4 seconds and between -2% and 16%. The difference can sometimes be negative
because of the small overhead of SecAlgo and the usual variation in running times of multi-process
protocols even when averaged over 50 runs.
Using DistAlgo is about 5 times as slow as Python, but that is expected and is the subject of
DistAlgo compilation and optimizations studied separately [LSL17].
The main result is that whether using DistAlgo or Python, using SecAlgo is at most a small
increase over using PyCrypto directly, while being safe and much simpler to use.
7 Related work and conclusion
There have been many efforts at building better cryptographic libraries providing simpler interfaces.
These include the NaCl library [BLS11, BLS12] for C and C++; libsodium [Fra17], a portable
version of NaCl with a slightly improved interface; the pyca/cryptography library [Pyt18a] for
Python; the Charm library [AGM+15, AGM+13] for Python; the Keyczar library [Tea16, DW15]
for C++, Java, and Python; and the Tink library [ABD+18] for C++, Java, Go, and Objective-C.
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Figure 3: Running times of NS-SK on increasing numbers of protocol runs.
These libraries simplify use of cryptographic operations in ways similar to SecAlgo. Simplifying
techniques to reduce the number of decisions for users include: (1) requiring fewer inputs from the
user, (2) handling tedious, routine tasks automatically behind the scenes, (3) supporting better
default configurations, and (4) removing unsafe algorithms and implementations.
However, these libraries fall short when compared with SecAlgo. Charm provides simplified
use for only a single operation—shared key authenticated encryption. pyca/cryptography provides
simplified use of only shared key authenticated encryption and X.509 certificate handling. Key-
czar and Tink provide only shared key authenticated encryption, hybrid encryption, signing, and
message authentication code creation. NaCl and libsodium provide a much more complete set of
cryptographic operations, but provide little to no configurability but only one algorithm for most
cryptographic operations.
Acar et al. [ABF+17] study the usability of five Python cryptographic libraries: PyCrypto [Lit13],
M2Crypto [SC18], Keyczar [Tea16, DW15], pyca/cryptography [Pyt18a], and PyNACL [Pyt18b]
(a Python binding of NACL). They found that clear documentation and concrete code examples
were the most significant factors determining whether subjects produced solutions that work. Fur-
thermore, they found that code written with simplified APIs were much more likely to be secure,
while code written with low-level libraries were more likely to contain mistakes that compromised
their security. SecAlgo provides higher-level, simpler APIs than these previous libraries.
Egele et al. [EBFK13, p. 81] study cryptographic misuse in Android and propose mitigation
strategies: (1) introduction of better default configurations in cryptographic libraries and (2) pro-
vision of better, more complete documentation of cryptographic libraries. SecAlgo realizes the first
by default configurations that implement best security practice and allows the second to be made
much simpler and easier to use.
FixDroid [NWA+17] is an IDE plug-in for the Android SDK that identifies cryptographic mis-
takes in source code, as it is written, and provides suggested corrections. CogniCrypt [KNR+17]
automatically generates Java code for a collection of common cryptographic tasks (e.g., encrypting
data with a password, storing passwords, secure communication, etc.) and performs static analysis
to verify that generated code is properly integrated into the user’s application. CDRep [MLLD16]
acts directly on Android binaries by using static analysis to detect cryptographic misuses and then
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generates and applies patches to correct them. Use of SecAlgo allows many tasks of such tools to
be greatly simplified or completely eliminated.
Security protocol specification languages are for abstract formulation and verification of secu-
rity protocols. Scyther [Cre14, Cre08], AVISPA [ARBO06a, ABB+05], ProVerif [Bla18, Bla14],
and CryptoVerif [BC18, Bla08] are process or role oriented similar to SecAlgo plus DistAlgo.
Tamarin [MSC+18, MSCB13] models the state of the protocol as a multi-set of facts and mod-
els protocol actions as rewrite rules operating on these facts. SecAlgo plus DistAlgo programs
are simpler than even abstract specifications written in most of these formal specification lan-
guages. Unlike these formal specification languages, SecAlgo is for building actual implementations
of security protocols as well as full-fledged secure applications.
In conclusion, SecAlgo provides simpler and more powerful high-level abstractions for crypto-
graphic operations and allows security protocols and applications to be written more easily and
clearly. Future work includes possible further optimization of the implementation to minimize
performance overhead, extension to support more combinations of best cryptographic functions
from different libraries, static checking and optimization of these combinations, more extensive use
and evaluation of the abstractions, and translation into languages of protocol verification tools such
as ProVerif and Scyther for formal verification.
Acknowledgements
We thank Rahul Sihag for help in detailed running time measurements and analysis, and Yuege
Chen and Wenjun Qu for protocol implementations in C# and Java. This work was supported in
part by NSF under grants CCF-1414078 and CNS-1421893 and ONR under grant N000141512208.
A Misuse prevention
To validate SecAlgo against main types of cryptographic misuse, we surveyed studies of misuses
that occur in mobile applications.
Table 8 presents results of our evaluation using four such studies. It shows that SecAlgo prevents
seven main types of cryptographic misuse out of a total of ten. Note that each misuse type reported
occurs at least once in each of the applications counted. Thus even the sum from CryptoLint alone
means that SecAlgo abstractions prevent at least 13232 instances of types of cryptographic misuse.
We describe how exactly SecAlgo prevents all of the misuse types listed in Table 8. They are
summarized in Table 9.
• M1K: Insufficient key size. This issue is handled by the keygen abstraction. The default
key sizes for all algorithms are safe as they guarantee at least 112 bits of security, which NIST
has determined as the minimum security strength allowable until 2030 [NIS16]. A key size
given explicitly at a call to keygen is checked against a whitelist for the algorithm and if the
key size is found to be insufficient, SecAlgo throws an exception.
• M2K: Hard-coded keys. Hard-coded keys are unsafe because they can be extracted by
binary disassembly. SecAlgo inhibits the use of hard-coded keys through easy generation of
keys using keygen and, in a planned extension, easy secure storage of keys.
• M1S: Encryption in ECB mode. Creation of a key for ECB mode is prevented during
keygen because ECB is not included in the the whitelist of allowed block cipher modes in
SecAlgo. The whitelist is checked again when the key is used preventing the use of keys whose
tags have been manually altered in an attempt to encrypt with ECB mode. Any attempt to
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Misuse type Description
Reported number of apps with this misuse type by study
CryptoLint CMA CNKX CDRep
M1K Insufficient key size - 1 7 -
M2K Constant or hardcoded keys 3644 0 4 882
M1S Encryption in ECB mode 7656 7 16 887
M2S Encryption with predictable IV 1932 8 2 979
M3S Encryption with obsolete algorithm - 8 16 -
M1A RSA encryption without OAEP - 3 2 -
M1H Hashing with obsolete algorithm - 38 16 5582
Sum Sum of numbers above 13232 65 63 8330
Total apps Total number of apps analyzed 11748 45 49 8640
Table 8: Misuse type and number of apps containing that type, plus total number of apps stud-
ied, using the misuse analysis systems CryptoLint [EBFK13], CMA [SGT+14], CNKX [CNKX16],
and CDRep [MLLD16]. Misuse types prevented by SecAlgo are listed; three other types stud-
ied [EBFK13, CNKX16, MLLD16] (a constant salt for password-based encryption (PBE), < 1000
iterations for PBE, and improper seeding for Java SecureRandom objects), not prevented by Sec-
Algo, are not listed. ’-’ means that the study did not report about instances of the corresponding
misuse type.
Misuse type Prevention
M1K excluded from whitelist of approved key sizes, safe defaults
M2K keygen generates random key at runtime
M1S excluded from whitelist of approved block modes of operation
M2S encrypt generates random IV when needed
M3S excluded from whitelists of approved encryption algorithms
M1A encrypt uses OAEP padding for RSA encryption, no alternative
M1H excluded from whitelist of approved hasing algorithms
Table 9: Summary of the way in which each misuse type is prevented by SecAlgo.
use unsafe block modes like ECB, detected by checking the whitelist of approved modes will
be reported as an error at runtime.
• M2S: Encryption with predictable IV. The default behaviour of encrypt generates IVs
automatically, thus preventing predictable IVs. SecAlgo uses a cryptographically strong ran-
dom number generator to generate the random data block to use as the IV as directed by
NIST SP 800-38A [Dwo01].
• M3S: Encryption with obsolete algorithm. As for M1S, this misuse is prevented by
having a whitelist of safe algorithms. Obsolete algorithms like DES, ARC2 and ARC4 stream
ciphers are not allowed by SecAlgo abstractions keygen, encrypt, and decrypt. Any attempt
to use an obsolete algorithm will be reported as an error at runtime.
• M1A: RSA encryption without OAEP.Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)
is the default padding scheme used with RSA by SecAlgo. SecAlgo does not offer any alter-
native to OAEP and thereby ensures safety.
• M1H: Hashing with obsolete algorithm. Unsafe hashing algorithms like MD2, MD4,
MD5 and SHA-1, are not in the whitelist of allowed hashing algorithms in SecAlgo. Any
attempt to use an obsolete algorithm will be reported as an error at runtime, as for M1S.
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